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Abstract 
A critical analysis of the dominant quantitative methodologies used to analyze 
international terrorism reveals serious flaws in the conceptualization of key terms, the 
measurement of key variables and the statistical estimation of key relationships, all of 
which lead to unsubstantiated results. I deconstruct these issues, and extend the literature 
on the relationship of regime type and acts of terrorism in the following ways: I add to 
the quantitative literature on the subject; I use an updated database on global terrorist 
events (START--Global Terrorism Database) which includes domestic and international 
events; and I analyze rates of terrorism by a variety of categories of system types across 
both space and time (all countries, 1970-2012).  I demonstrate that democracies are not 
the primary targets of terrorists, and that much more work needs to be done to understand 
the causes of extreme political violence, given its non-random, yet highly stochastic 
nature. 
Brief Biography 
Dr. Bryan Brophy-Baermann is an assistant professor of political science, and Chair of 
the Social Sciences Division at Lesley University in Cambridge, MA.  His training and 
experience are largely within the sub-fields of international relations and comparative 
politics, with emphases on political violence and terrorism, U.S. foreign policy, and 
environmental politics.
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Democracy Causes Terrorism: 
Methodological Flaws, a New Approach, and a New Answer1 
One of the most fundamental questions asked about terrorism2 is this: do 
democracies invite or cause more acts of terrorism than non-democracies? Going back 
over forty years to Paul Wilkinson’s Terrorism and the Liberal State ([1977] 1986 revised 
ed.), the presumption, and the theories based on that presumption, have asserted that 
democracies are, in fact, particularly vulnerable to acts of terror. Moreover, they argue 
that terrorists target democracies in particular. These long held beliefs have been 
challenged more recently. Scholars on both sides of the issue believe they have the 
evidence to support their theoretical claims, but the results are mixed and sometimes 
based on dubious data. Given this lack of academic consensus, it is not a mystery that the 
dominant cultural paradigm in the United States, if not in the West more generally, 
remains as valid in the presidency of Barack Obama as it was under President Ronald 
Reagan (and the decades in between): democracies are at greatest risk (Levitt 1988; Ross 
1993; Hoffman 2006, and Wilkinson’s more recent book, 2011). 
This paper challenges the dominant paradigm, the conclusions about the positive 
relationship between democracies and terrorism, by addressing the following questions: 
how have we been testing democracy/terrorism hypotheses? What are the dominant 
methodologies? What are our sources of data? How generalizable are the results? Is 
large-N quantitative analysis of international terrorism the best way to test the 
democracy/terrorism hypothesis? Does the dominant paradigm rest on solid, empirical 
ground? I argue that the answers to these questions are these: the methods are 
inappropriate given the data being used; the data itself rarely matches the questions being 
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asked; and, given these two findings, I argue that the results of most quantitative analysis 
of terrorism cannot be generalized and that the large-N approach is not the best approach 
to use to test what is essentially a nation-state level problem. These methodological issues 
make coming to a consensus about an empirically validated reality of the 
democracy/terrorism relationship particularly difficult. To address these methodological 
challenges, I argue that we should take a step back from the statistical trees and look at 
the forest of the levels and trends of terrorism as a whole, over time, to see that there is 
no clear-cut empirical support for the longstanding belief that democracies experience 
more terrorism than non-democracies. 
Previous Literature 
Historically, terrorism has been studied from a variety of perspectives: terrorists 
as psychologically unstable individuals (e.g. Crenshaw 1988); terrorists as rational, 
strategic political actors who calculate costs and benefits and negotiate (e.g. Atkinson et 
al. 1987); terrorists as domestic or international criminals (e.g. Bassiouni 1975); terrorists 
as numerically and materially disadvantaged political actors challenging oppression; 
terrorists as guerilla warriors or revolutionaries (e.g. Thornton 1964); counter- terrorism 
policies, strategies and effectiveness (e.g. Enders and Sandler 1993); and, less often, state 
actors as terrorists (e.g. Herman 1982). Most of this research has been focused on: a 
specific case or incident; a set of interviews; a specific group or acts of violence in a 
specific place during a specific time (e.g. Palmer 1994; Levitt 2006). This type of 
research leaned towards the detailed case study, the qualitative, non-generalizable side of 
the methodological spectrum (with the notable exceptions of the bargaining and policy 
analysis work) (Atkinson et al. 1987; Sandler and Scott 1987). However, due to the 
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nature of the topic (its immediacy, its dramatic effects, and the need to “end” it), results 
from case studies or rare events have been often held up as being, in fact, generalizable 
(how could we study a group and not know what to do?). The findings were made public 
via conferences or mass media as facts we “know” (with certainty!) about terrorism. In 
the past twenty years, there has been a push towards the other side of the methodological 
spectrum, the large-N, less detailed (modeled), quantified, statistical end. These scholars 
have sought to build on what we have learned from the case study work, to attempt to 
build a more generalizable set of findings on the democracy/terrorism hypothesis (as only 
one of the topics subjected to econometric analysis) that would hold across space and 
time. 
Young and Findley (2011) do a remarkable and much-needed meta-analysis of the 
research on terrorism across a variety of disciplines. They show that the number of 
articles focusing on terrorism, published in leading academic journals, has skyrocketed 
since 2001 (as we might have guessed), but that we have yet to assemble a “lessons 
learned” from all of that new literature,3 especially in the more recent quantitative 
literature. They point out a number of problems in the relatively scant quantitative 
literature. From this meta-analysis, we know that the literature on terrorism is growing, 
but is not particularly systematic or cumulative. 
One of the goals of this paper is to expand on Young and Findley’s identification 
of methodological problems, most prominently, data/concept problems (Young and 
Findley 2011, 412).4 A particularly relevant finding from their analysis is this: specific 
types of democratic participation are unrelated to three variations of terrorism: 
transnational, suicide and “exporting” terrorism (Young and Findley 2011, 428).5 This 
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finding is a beginning to challenging the dominant paradigm—if democratic participation 
is unrelated to different types of terrorism, on what does the asserted relationship rest? I 
pursue a more detailed challenge to the democracy/terrorism hypothesis below. 
Li (2005) summarizes articulately the underlying arguments of the competing 
hypotheses and goes on to discuss the competing quantitative results: 
The first argument expects that democracy reduces transnational terrorism. 
Democratic societies offer access for citizens to seek recourse to their grievances, 
while democratic rules ensure the nonviolent resolution of conflicts of interest. 
Hence, groups in democratic societies are more likely to pursue nonviolent 
alternatives rather than costly terrorist activities to further their interest. The 
second argument, however, suggests that democracy encourages terrorism. 
Democratic countries provide relatively more freedom of speech, movement, and 
association, permitting parochial interests to get organized and reducing the costs 
of conducting terrorist activities. Open democratic societies therefore facilitate 
terrorism (Li 2005, 278). 
On the “democracies reduce terror” side (in the quantitative literature) we find Sandler 
(1995), and Eyerman (1998). On the “democracies encourage terrorism” side we find 
Eubank and Weinberg (1994, 1998, 2001) and Li and Schaub (2004). Li’s conclusion: the 
evidence weighs in on the side of democracy causing terrorism; although, he believes the 
theoretical and methodological work is somewhat flawed (Li 2005, 279). 
Of the journal articles published on the specific question of democracy and 
terrorism in the last ten years, Li’s (2005) analysis is closest to what I am trying to test, so 
I focus on his work as representative of the types of problems I see in the quantitative 
analysis of terrorism.6 The first major problem in the quantitative literature is the use of 
transnational terrorism events as the data source to test hypotheses about democracy and 
terrorism (with two exceptions, Eubank and Weinberg 1998; Young and Findley 2011). 
In the summary of arguments presented by Li (see above), it is pointed out that 
democracies create less violent environments because citizens have options for peaceful 
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conflict resolution. How would this local environment affect populations residing outside 
of that bounded political space (transnational actors)? Or, how would this affect those 
democratic citizens were they to want to act transnationally, and want to do so because 
the target of their actions was either democratic or non-democratic? Or, what about the 
case of a procedural democracy in which citizens’/constituents’ voices could not be heard 
or registered (e.g. a lack of substantive democracy)? In fact, whatever the political system 
from which the person who might engage in an act of terrorism originates, when that 
person acts outside of his or her polity, he or she is acting in an “authoritarian” setting. 
Democratic politics is the stuff of domestic affairs. Crossing borders to act means you are 
either acting in an “international” setting, or you are acting as an “outsider” to the 
officially regulated politics of a nation state (e.g., who can vote? who can lobby? who can 
form a political party or interest group? etc.). These are settings in which a person cannot 
formally register a complaint, a setting in which the government is not obligated to listen 
or to respond because the outside person is not a constituent, a setting in which outside 
actors influence on domestic decision-making is limited. In practice, all transnational acts 
of terrorism are actions within a non-democratic political structure.7 The fundamental 
argument about democracy’s effects would have to be limited to domestic terrorism, 
unless further theoretical development could tie transnational acts to a domestic 
environment (which has not been done, and given my argument above, would be difficult 
to argue). Using international terrorist events data to analyze largely domestically 
occurring actions does not make sense. In addition to the logic of the data/issue problem, 
Li (2005, 280) states quite clearly the pragmatic case for using international incidents of 
terrorism, “Because extant empirical evidence in the democracy-terrorism literature is 
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exclusively based on transnational terrorism data, I choose to focus on transnational 
terrorist incidents in this article.” Not only is there no well-developed theoretical 
connection between democracy and transnational terrorism, transnational events data is 
used in most analyses, simply because it has been used before (mostly, if not 
exclusively). The source of data is atheoretic at best and inappropriate and misleading at 
worst. 
A second major problem in the quantitative literature, exemplified by Li (2005) 
and Li and Schaub (2004), is the common use of “accepted” control variables. Accepted 
control variables are described by the authors of quantitative analyses as a set of 
“background” variables, the parts of an explanation that lay outside of the very specific 
hypotheses a researcher is trying to test. Once these variables have been used in one 
study, they are often used repeatedly without further investigation or justification; they 
are inserted into a model because concepts represented by these control variables 
“probably” have some sort of effect on the predicted relationship. This statistical 
methodology is a way to create a more experimental setting in the natural world: hold all 
of “these things” constant, and test for the interaction of the few “interesting” variables 
under study.8 My critique is that “accepted control variables” are correlational controls, 
added without significant theorizing (or with faulty theorizing). This strategy muddles the 
findings of a statistical model. While I do not argue that all econometric analyses of 
terrorism have to proceed in a stepwise fashion, I do believe establishing a fundamental 
relationship between the variables under study is an important first step, before refining 
the relationship by controlling for factors that may be leading to a false (Type I error) 
conclusion (because of, for example, potential over-prediction or spuriousness). In both 
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of the articles listed here, the control variables are merely listed and described (in terms 
of values, measurement, etc.)—without theoretical justification. I address my 
methodological concerns about the commonly used independent control variables below 
(the list comes from Li 2005, 295). 
GDP per capita and Income inequality is meant to capture one of the common 
beliefs about the causes of terrorism: “poverty” causes dissatisfaction, which causes, 
ultimately, violent behavior; and if this is true, we need to “drain the swamp” (Piazza 
2007). However, a quick reflection of the dominant terrorism of the 1970s should give 
pause to those thinking that being poor drives terrorism. Much of the terrorism in the 
1970s was in places like Italy, Spain and West Germany and the UK (Northern Ireland 
and Great Britain in particular), certainly not the richest countries in the world, but not 
the poorest, and certainly not failed or failing states (we could debate the democratic 
stability of two of the cases, but….) Moreover, we know that those who acknowledge 
being the perpetrators of acts of terrorism are often educated and wealthy, sociable and, 
up until the act at least, seen as psychologically stable. Yes, the poor and unemployed 
engage in extreme acts of political violence too. However, the depth of poverty and/or the 
range of inequality do not, in themselves, cause political conflict to the point of pushing 
someone to commit violence in general, and terrorist violence in particular. There are 
many steps between frustration and disillusionment and blowing up a marketplace full of 
civilians. Simply put, a mix of people from a variety of economic backgrounds have 
engaged in acts of terrorism across time and space, and there is no obvious theoretical 
reason to think wealth—either at the individual level or at the nation-state level 
countries—would produce fewer events. One quick thought experiment: does economic 
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happiness necessarily produce political happiness? One might go so far as to argue that 
economic success produces a level of self-efficacy that could lead to disruptive political 
behavior. 
Regime durability: this is a variable based on regime “change” and “new” 
democracies. Li cites the previously mentioned Eubank and Weinberg (1998) and 
Eyerman (1998) to claim that the confounding effects of these transition periods must be 
accounted for. First, the Eubank and Weinberg study is limited because it is based on a 
two-year period of analysis. The Eyerman study is limited because of its data 
(ITERATE)—see above. More theoretically, what would be behind this relationship? 
Terrorism is an act of violence outside the norms of any society and the international 
system—why would a group seek to ostracize itself right after a government has 
changed? And would this relationship hold true in ANY country with a regime change 
and ANY country in the early stages of democratization? I have severe doubts, given that 
many countries democratize, but relatively few suffer from large numbers of terrorist 
incidents. Without a strong theoretical tie between transition and extra-normal political 
violence, I see no reason to label the variable as “too important to exclude” (Li 2005, 
286). 
Size is a variable that means: the bigger the population, logged, the more (or less) 
terrorism; the direction of the relationship is not listed in the variable list, but in the 
findings section of the articles, the relationship is positive. No explanation for the 
direction of the predicted relationship is provided. Size is most likely highly correlated 
with GDP per capita (another methodological problem). On some level it makes sense 
that the more people—in a constrained space—the more likely you’ll find an outlier, but 
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that is hardly the kind of theorizing we should be using to model acts of terrorism. 
Moreover, if the space weren’t too constrained (e.g. USA/China/Russia), how would 
“size” come to matter? In the absence of an obvious theory, and without an explanation 
of a causal relationship where, it seems to me, there is no plausible causal relationship, I 
would argue that the variable should be left out of the model. 
Government capability is an index variable of government “strength.” No 
explanation is given, again. What is the plausible relationship between government power 
and terrorism? If a government is strong, it might seem unassailable, unmovable, more 
authoritarian (force/power as the ultimate source of conflict resolution), and less likely to 
be amendable to demands by citizens. If this were true, a person or group might think the 
wisest choice is to send a message to the government, rather than attacking it head-on. In 
this scenario, government strength might lead to more terrorism (positive). However, and 
on the contrary, as a control variable, “strength” is thought to have a negative influence. 
If a government is weak, it might be vulnerable to external pressure, including a bloody 
or bloodless coup—but in this case, why would anyone want to send a message—
wouldn’t a more strategic and rational choice be to attack the weak government directly 
to show its inadequacies and to, perhaps, loosen its grip on power? A weak government 
might not even have the capacity to “get” a message, if it is having a difficult time 
maintaining power in the first place (failed or failing state). In this instance, an act of 
terrorism might simply be categorized as yet another “enemy” attack on the crumbing 
edifice of governmental power, and this would look more like insurgency or rebellion. 
Again, the relationship between capacity and terrorism is less than obvious. 
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Past incident is a variable that maintains: if it’s happened before it’ll happen 
again. There is more merit in this control variable than any other I’ve reviewed so far, 
and even I have used a lagged dependent variable of this type in my own work (Brophy-
Baermann and Conybeare 1994). The theory behind using a lagged dependent variable 
includes the following assumptions: the behavior has become regularized/normalized; the 
underlying conflict process is a long-term issue; examples of past success—if even only 
the perception of success, leads to imitation. However, the frequent inclusion of this 
variable in the majority of recent quantitative analyses, often without clear theoretical 
justification, requires a better-developed rationale to be created. More work needs to be 
done to complete the theoretical framework explaining how “the average number of past 
events” in a certain set of years “predict” or “explain” current rates. There is nothing 
useful or explanatory in the statement: “We’ve averaged ten murders per year in our city 
for the past twenty years so we’ll probably face ten murders in our fine city this year.” 
This is a prediction but not an explanation, and predicting the long-term average doesn’t 
tell us much. It is a best guess. Moreover, this “typical” rate should be captured in the 
constant of the equation—the typical amount of terrorism in the system controlling for all 
other factors. One might argue that acts of terrorism in the past are indicators of what is 
possible in the future. Setting this “mood” or “climate” of terrorism is a qualitative affect, 
however; there is nothing in that theory that would lead us to predict the exact influence 
of a certain number of acts in the past on a certain number of acts today or in the future. 
Moreover, this argument implies that terrorism can never end, that the climate or culture 
of terrorism cannot be stopped (the deterministic influence of the past). If so, this 
hypothesis is not only qualitative, it is fixed (constant) and not susceptible to changes in 
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people or institutions or policies from year to year (another quantitative methodology 
problem). So, while plausible at first, because of the lagged dependent variable’s 
typically highly correlated association with the dependent variable, I do not see any 
strong theoretical connection requiring this independent control variable to be included in 
the model. 
Conflict is a variable that tries to capture the idea that if a state is engaged in 
interstate (important to note) conflict, it will experience more terrorism. If Country X is 
engaged in military conflict with Country Y, citizens of Country X will be more driven to 
engage in terrorism against X or Y (or vice versa). This is unclear to me. Don’t most 
citizens rally to support their governments when they get involved in foreign affairs, 
especially violent foreign affairs? Even if they disapprove of their government’s actions, 
would they really start to attack from within to send a message to the decision-makers? 
Perhaps citizens of the country under attack (Country Y in this case) would strike out at 
Country X, and even in unconventional ways. Would this situation reflect a causal 
relationship between government type and political violence (the original 
hypothesis/question)? And why would any of the above named groups resort to terrorist, 
unconventional violence as opposed to any other type of political violence, particularly 
given the legalized environment of violence (during a war) in which almost anything 
goes? If a weak country is trying to defend itself against an aggressive country and has no 
means to resist directly, and therefore resorts to what we label normally as terrorism, 
would these acts fit the typical typology of terrorism (state on state violence during 
‘war’)? The country is simply fighting back during an interstate conflict between two un-
equal states. Violence might beget violence, but as I argued with “past incidents,” 
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atheoretic correlation does not help us understand; and the complexity of the relationship 
of this control variable with levels of terrorism is difficult to untangle. 
Region dummies are variables created to measure terrorist event rates around the 
world, relative to the Middle East (the ‘standard’ case). The interesting issue about this 
set of variables is that if they are statistically significant, we might be forced to conclude 
that any relationship between the primary variables (government type and terrorism) is 
spurious, or at least secondary. If region is the driving factor, domestic system type is 
likely to have a marginal impact. Beyond that, it is mildly interesting to know if some 
parts of the world experience more terrorism that others. That interest is tempered, 
however, by the essentialist and over-generalized approach of regional analysis. One 
cannot help but think of, on the academic side, “clashing civilizations,” (e.g. Huntington 
1994) or, on the colloquial side, gross stereotypes (“all Muslims are terrorists”). Are all 
Europeans, Africans, Asians and Americans really similar enough, respectively, to 
capture a “type” of people who might engage in more or less terrorism? Also, it is 
possible that the regions variable is correlated with government capability or regime 
change or GDP or any of the control variables listed above; this independent variable co-
variation is potentially problematic in a typical quantitative analysis. Region might also 
be a proxy for regime type (are most countries in a region democracies? non-
democracies?—also without much variation), which would correlate highly with any 
measure created to represent the concept of democracy. Simply saying that there is more 
violence “here” or “there,” is descriptive but unhelpful. The theoretical reasoning behind 
including region in a causal model needs significant development. 
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Post-cold war is a variable to measure the effect of the end of the Cold War. It is 
coded as zero until 1991, then 1. Again, on the face of it, this is an interesting control 
variable tied to a reasonably well developed theory: the policies and practices of the 
major players in the Cold War constrained instability and asymmetric violence, and now 
that the “lid” is off, and the lone Super Power (the USA) cannot re-close the lid or 
contain the wildfires popping up all around the world, entropy has taken hold. Now, 
disorder or disintegration or allowing simmering fights to finally rise to the level of 
physical conflict is NOT the same as saying all of this would lead to extra-normal acts of 
political violence—the signal sending inherent in terrorism. A quick look at the 
frequency plot below also calls this hypothesized relationship into question. There were 
more terrorist events in the late 1980s and early 1990s than in the middle years of the 
1990s. The general trend of terrorist events pre-1991 and post-2003 is quite similar. 
Moreover, narrowing our view to the 1991 to 2011 time period, the distribution of the 
number of terrorist events looks very much like a “U”—an extremely non-linear 
relationship between acts and time, with the first half being a negative relationship and 
the second half being positive. A simple dichotomous variable, with a “positive” value 
after 1991, does not align with the observable data at all. So, while the “what happens 
now that the Cold War is over?” hypothesis is intriguing, that macro-systemic conflict 
process does not seem to have a causal relationship to the reality of terrorist events over 
time; or, if it does, we need a non-linear, much more complex representation of the 
relationship. 
Much quantitative work on the issue of terrorism has been done in the past ten 
years (Young and Findley 2011, 411). While the range of questions being asked, from the 
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influence of political systems or economic globalization to anti-terrorism policies, 
academics from many disciplines have wrestled with the challenge of building 
explanatory models of terrorism (e.g. Brooks 2009; Quan and Schaub 2004; Findley and 
Young 2007). However, there remain fundamental challenges that need to be addressed 
before we move forward; some of these challenges are: we need more explicit and 
theoretically grounded explanations for the specific control variables we want to use; we 
need to better justify why we need to use “controls” at all (and, e.g., why not simply call 
them explanatory variables?); we need to clarify how the use of these control variables in 
attempting to explain terrorist events differs from the use of the same variables when 
predicting other social/political behavior (see Note 8). If we do not resolve the theoretical 
issues outlined above—particularly the issues of high complexity and potentially both 
positive and negative effects of the given variables (GDP, income inequality, regime 
durability, size, government capacity, conflict, regional dummies, post-Cold War, and to 
a lesser extent, past incident)—we will continue to generate unreliable (and un-
replicable) statistical models. If we can’t generate reliable models, we can’t generalize 
about the hypothesized relationship; we can’t assert probable causation with any level of 
certainty (therefore, a dominant paradigm could not exist). 
It might appear from the discussion above that I do not believe we should control 
for anything in trying to answer the question of political system influence on terrorism. 
This conclusion would be incorrect; I believe any control we use must be theoretically 
grounded, appropriately measured, and carefully coded. Moreover, if political system 
type has a significant influence on terrorism, we should see that influence whether it is 
rich or poor or new or old or large or small. If wealth, level of consolidation and 
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geographic size (for example) limit significantly the impact of political system on 
terrorism (the whole purpose of using controls), then whether a country is a democracy or 
not becomes a contingent factor, rather than an important factor on its own. If this is true, 
then the nature of a political system—all things being equal—could not be the primary, 
first-order driver of levels of unconventional political violence. If we fail to critically 
review the basics or our methodological approaches, that is, the applicability of datasets 
and the theoretical relevance of independent control variables, we will find ourselves 
encountering more “pitfalls” than “promising” explanatory models (Young and Findley 
2011), and the generalizable research on terrorism will not move the field or the policy-
making world forward. 
Methodology 
In this analysis I address the methodological problems I have outlined above. I am 
most interested in exploring the possible association between a nation-state’s 
fundamental political structure and acts of terrorism. As the review of previous research 
shows, we are far from having a well-developed theory or set of theories to explain why 
structure might matter. No one, to my knowledge, has started from the beginning, from 
the basic approach of first looking for correlation between the concepts/variables. This 
missing step is central to determining if it is meaningful to move forward into more 
complex analysis (that is, if the relationship exists in a bivariate setting, it could be 
weakened or eliminated by adding controls; however, I believe we should test to see if 
any relationship exists in the first place). I examine terrorism using the START Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD n.d.). I include data from all nation-states from 1970-2011, 
including countries that “ceased to exist” and countries that were “created” (database 
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details below). While data is not available for all countries for every calendar year over 
the entire period (e.g. newly independent countries; data problems for 1993), the missing 
data is not problematic given my operationalization of the variables under study. I use the 
Freedom House index to represent political system type. I use a multi-step approach to 
re-examine the fundamental ideas about variation in the location of acts of terrorism and 
variation in acts of terrorism over time. First, I inspect the annual number of events for all 
states over time; I do this to create a baseline measure against other databases and 
research projects, as well as to look for outliers in the data.9 Second, I aggregate terrorist 
events by Freedom House designations (both the average of the Civil Liberties and 
Political Rights scores 1-7, and the Free, Partly Free, Not Free averaged scores 1-3) by 
year, by decade, and by series. Third, I review the detailed distribution of events by the 
original Freedom House ratings to look for nuances among Partly Free countries. Fourth, 
I look for outlier categories across terrorism by system type in the aggregate. Is the 
distribution what we would expect (normal? skewed left? right?)?. 
The quantitative methodological approaches most often used in the analysis of 
terrorism have been based on the concept of the event count, often, but not always, 
aggregated at the annual level. This has caused many methodological problems, because 
acts of terrorism are often few and far between, leaving data sets with lots of zeros. 
Moreover, the event either happens or it does not, so, having a dichotomous variable on 
the left hand side of the equation causes further problems. These issues have been 
addressed by using a variety of models (see the literature mentioned above), but I believe 
this approach is fundamentally flawed when trying to answer questions about the 
influence of political structures on acts of terrorism. 
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Adding together terrorist events is not like adding together dollars or automobile 
deaths or even years of education. Terrorist attacks are not interval level data. Consider 
the following scenarios. One: A country with a history of very little political violence, 
and few if any major terrorist events, is attacked, with much death and destruction 
resulting. The general population and the government are likely to be shocked, taken by 
surprise, and to react accordingly. The impact of the attack would be significant and 
enduring (“the world has changed”). Two: A country with a past history of political 
conflict, but at “peace” at the present time, suffers regular terrorist events, is attacked 
multiple times per month, month after month, from missile attacks, to suicide bombings 
to political assassination. The general population and the government are not likely to be 
shocked or taken by surprise. Acts of terrorism become routinized; responses to those 
acts become institutionalized; the daily lives of most of the population are not affected 
significantly (“the world has not changed”). Three: A country in the midst of political 
violence, either international or civil or some combination of the two, suffers acts of 
terrorism as one of many forms of political violence used against it. The general 
population and the government are not likely to be shocked or taken by surprise. Acts of 
terrorism and responses to those acts are likely to be folded into the larger political 
conflict and the government’s attempt to defeat its enemies. 
In the foregoing scenarios, one terrorist attack does not carry the same meaning 
across political and cultural space; therefore, adding terrorist events together does not 
have the same meaning across political and cultural space. The empirical reality of the 
acts of terrorism does not match the political and cultural meanings of the acts of 
terrorism. The concept of terrorism is tied to the political and cultural environment and 
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our typical operationalization of that concept is to count and sum attacks; however, if the 
meaning of the attacks is not adequately captured in the (empirically measurable) attacks 
themselves, we have a methodological problem. What looks like a valid measure on the 
face of it is actually riven with internal and content validity problems. 
Where does this leave us? We have several options. First, we could ignore the 
problem and carry on as we have. I reject this approach. Second, we could attempt to 
compile an index of terrorism so that events plus their political and cultural impacts and 
meanings can be taken into account; that is, adding much needed context to the 
assessment of the nature of political violence. This would be the best approach; however, 
the approach would require enormous amount of site-specific data (dozens of countries 
over decades of years), data for which we don’t readily have access. Third, we could 
narrow our approach and focus on country or region, allowing for the in-depth collection 
of data. This would limit our ability to make and test cross-cultural and/or international 
hypotheses. The in-depth, cultural approach would be much more qualitative, but that 
might be where the desire to accurately measure the concepts and generate the data lead 
us. Fourth, and the approach I take here, we could re-conceptualize the operationalization 
of an act of terrorism to be a qualitative, ordinal level variable, one that we could 
aggregate into any number of categories representing the “intensity” of terrorism. 
This approach to measuring terrorism captures everything from the single 
incident, single day, world-changing event to the minor attacks where no one is killed or 
wounded and little or no property damage is done. The Terrorism Intensity Index = (E + 
PK + PW)*PD where: 
E = the terrorist event (1) 
104Journal of Pedagogy, Pluralism, and Practice, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 8https://digitalcommons.lesley.edu/jppp/vol6/iss1/8
PK = total number of people killed in the event (1….ni) 
PW = total number of people wounded in the event (1….ni) 
PD = the extent of property damage (1=minor, 2=major, 3=severe)10. 
The variable “Terrorism Intensity Index” can be summed by whatever timeframe is 
needed. In this paper I will total terrorism intensity by year, by decade, and by the length 
of the entire series, 1970-2011. Creating this index gives us a sense of the impact of 
terrorism in a wide variety of cases without having to conduct a detailed historical, 
conflict-process-based, economic analysis of every site affected by an act of terrorism. It 
does not under-weigh significant single events, nor does it over-weigh multiple, but less 
significant, events. It captures the environment of terrorism in a systematic and 
comparable (ordinal) way, while being fundamentally qualitative. We cannot say that the 
distance between the Terrorism Intensity Index score for a time period in Country X is 
exactly some distance from the Terrorism Intensity Index score of a time period in 
Country Y, but we can say that the intensity of terrorism in Country X is more or less 
than in Country Y. Terrorism Intensity Index scores are coded into the following values: 
minimal (MIN), moderate (MOD), severe (SEV), where: 
MIN = Terrorism Intensity Index ≤ 10 
MOD = 10 < Terrorism Intensity Index ≤ 100 
SEV = 100 < Terrorism Intensity Index 
I add a new way of thinking about time, democracy (or non-democracy) and acts 
of terrorism to this new categorical, terrorism intensity, approach. I believe the intensity 
of terrorism, when looking at the variation between democracies and non-democracies, is 
best measured at a much longer time scale than monthly, quarterly or even annually. This 
105Brophy-Baermann: Democracy Causes Terrorism: Methodological Flaws, a New Approach, and a New Answer
Published by DigitalCommons@Lesley, 2014
is a meaningful and relevant proposal because nation-states do not change from one type 
of political system to another very frequently, and when they do, the transition to, say, a 
demonstrably democratic system takes years if not decades. Because the variation on the 
key explanatory variable is so limited, we are working, in a sense, with a set of near-
constant values. Yes, countries change, but not very many at a time and not very often. 
Lack of variation is another inherent methodological problem when trying to apply 
econometric analysis to this fundamental relationship between system structure and 
extreme political violence. 
The variables for this analysis are: 
TII3 Terrorism Intensity Index, by category (1=MIN, 2=MOD, 
3=SEV); each event is calculated; TII index score is then summed 
as needed, by country, system type, or by year, decade, etc. 
FH3 Freedom House Freedom Ratings (1=FREE, 2=PARTLY FREE, 
3=NOT FREE), assigned to each country for each year (derived 
from the original Freedom House ratings (CL + PR / 2 = 1-7, then 
converted to 1-3) 
Data 
I use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), produced under the auspices of the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
as a measure of acts of terrorism. According to the START website (About GTD n.d.), 
the GTD is the most comprehensive open-source database on terrorism events. It includes 
both domestic and international events. It is important to note that the vast majority 
(90+%) of terrorist events in the world over the decades are domestic, that is, they only 
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include actors associated with one nation-state. The GTD database is, for all practical 
purposes a domestic terrorism database. The number of domestic events, across nearly 
four decades, overwhelms the bias that might be created by the relatively small number 
of transnational/international events in any given year. 
As outlined in my critique of current practices, previous quantitative research has 
often used the well-known ITERATE database (Mickolus et al. 2003), a database of 
transnational/international terrorism events only. These data sets are used even when a 
scholar is looking at the effect of a political system on the generation of acts of terrorism 
within a country. This mismatch of data and hypothesis is another fundamental problem 
that this paper seeks to address. At the time I requested access to the raw data (October 
2013), the database covered events from 1970 through the end of 2011 (START plans to 
update the GTD annually), for all nation-states in existence in a given year. For example, 
prior to 1990, Germany would have been coded as either West Germany or East 
Germany, after unification, Germany. The same practice was followed for all newly 
independent or re-created states during the timeframe under study (GTD Codebook 2012, 
12-15). As explained it the GTD Codebook (2012, 3), events from the year 1993 are not
included in the database due to lost data. This is not an issue for this research because I 
am looking at aggregations of events across system types of multi-year periods. 
Eliminating one year of data for all system types from the forty-year series will not bias 
assessment of the relationship between structure and violence (if all countries are 
removed for a year, there is no bias of the number of democracies or non-democracies 
because they are all removed). The GTD defines acts of terrorism using elements often 
found in definitions of terrorism used by other database creators: the intentional use of 
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violence or the threat of violence by sub-state actors, when (and this is a somewhat 
unique approach to coding) at least two of the following three elements are present—the 
event takes place outside the context of warfare, there is an attempt to reach a wider 
audience beyond the immediate victims of the attack, and the individual or group must be 
seeking to attain a political, religious, economic or social goal (GTD Codebook 2012, 6). 
I use a database from the Freedom House as a measure of the level of democracy 
in any given political system. I am aware of the criticisms of using the Freedom House 
methodology/data in assessing levels of democracy, in particular, its oversimplification 
(Inkeles 1991) and its potential political bias (Steiner 2014). However, I do not see those 
challenges as relevant. First, I am not studying democracy per se; I am looking at the 
basic system levels (even though Freedom House is not that basic to begin with---see its 
coding methodology). I am not trying to get at the nuance of just how substantive a 
democracy might be vs. how procedural—I am trying to look at the fundamentals of the 
systems: is governing primarily a top-down, imposed type of model, or is it basically 
interactive, where “the people” have some say in governance. It might be the case that 
such in-depth nuance is necessary if the null hypothesis between democracy/terrorism is 
accepted; however, as I argue, first things first.11 I use the average score of the political 
rights and civil liberties ratings, the country’s Freedom Rating, ranging from 1.0-7.0, 
where 1.0-2.5 is FREE (1), 3.0-5.0 is PARTLY FREE (2) and 5.5-7.0 is NOT FREE (3) 
(Freedom House Methodology n.d.) This dataset contains country ratings from 1973-
2014. Given this range, the effective range of analysis for this paper is 1973-2011. 
Analysis 
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A review of the following frequency distribution, captured from the GTD website 
(GTD Data Rivers n.d.) gives us a good reason to question the alternative hypothesis, that 
is, the hypothesis predicting the statistically significant impact of the role of political 




The longitudinal plot of terrorist incidents is volatile and non-linear. We find a steep 
positive trend starting in the early 1970s and peaking approximately twenty years later. 
The steepness of the trend is indicated by the range capturing the annual number of 
incidents in the world, from approximately 500 incidents in 1971 to ten times as many, 
approximately 5000, in 1991. Thereafter we see a plunge in the number of incidents; in 
fewer than ten years, the number of recorded incidents worldwide drops from the peak of 
5000 to a high of fewer than 1000 incidents in the late 1990s, leveling to around 1100 
incidents through approximately 2003. The trend climbs steeply again from 2003 to the 
end of the series, ending with a count of approximately 4500 terrorist incidents. Given 
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this volatility, it should be predicted, on the face of it, that political structure might 
account of only a small amount of the variation seen in the rates of terrorism over time; 
the numbers and types of democracies and non-democracies simply do not fluctuate in 
the ways we see incidents fluctuate.12 
Figure 2 is a frequency distribution of the new variable, Terrorism Intensity Index 
(Terrorism Intensity Index calculated per event, aggregated per year for comparison with 
the raw event data). 
Figure 2 
The distribution is similar to the distribution of the raw event count data in Figure 
1; this is to be expected and is also a verification of the accuracy of the newly created 
variable. The figures should look similar because the intensity variable is based on the 
event count, and is meant to amplify the significance of any given event. The trend is 
similar, but the impact of events can be seen in the higher values across time, with the 
peaks near 6000 instead of 5000 and the mid-1990s lows dip to an average of 
approximately 1500 instead of 1000. All in all, most events are of minimal impact, but 
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of terrorism in the system over time. Now that we have the baseline established and 
verified, we can move into the analysis of terrorism intensity by system type, and across 
time. 
The first step is to look at the distribution of terrorist intensity by simplified 
Freedom Rating for the entire series. Figure 3 is that frequency distribution. 
Figure 3 
The modal value is Partly Free (40%), followed by Free (36%) and Not Free (24%). This 
initial distribution leads us to neither accept nor reject either null hypothesis about the 
relationship between system structure and levels of terrorism. Countries in the Free 
category encounter terrorism significantly more often than countries in the Not Free 
category; however, given the fact that most cases fall in the mixed category, the answer 
to the question is more complicated. A closer look at the rates of terrorism, categorized 
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provides more insight into the space within which those choosing to engage in acts of 
terrorism find opportunity (Table 1 and Figure 4): 
Table 1 
Freedom Rating & Frequency of Terrorism 
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 
5% 6% 4% 19% 9% 8% 8% 9% 6% 13% 9% 1% 3% 
Figure 4 
I have highlighted the areas (in bold) at the breaking points between Free and Partly Free, 
and Partly Free and Not Free. Of the thirteen categories in the range of the 1-7 Freedom 
Rating, 50% of the incidents of terrorism happen at these two transition junctures. These 
findings indicate that the political system itself might be less important than the purity of 
the system. Democracies give fewer incentives and much opportunity; authoritarian 
regimes give many incentives but little opportunity. Balancing democratic and 
authoritarian elements might give the most incentive to groups to act in unconventional 
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transitions/consolidation factors outlined by Eubank and Weinberg and Eyerman (cited 
above). A Freedom Rating is not the same as being a “new” democracy or a 
“consolidated” democracy, nor is the country necessarily undergoing “transition.” A 
country could be on the “cusp” of being more democratic (authoritarian) or less 
democratic (authoritarian) for any length of time. I see the mix of democratic and 
authoritarian tendencies as more important than the “flux” in a given system. 
A more detailed look at terrorism intensity over time complicates the answer even 
further. The table below shows the amount of terrorism in each country type by decade. 
As I argued above, there is no theoretical reason to think that system type will fluctuate 
dramatically over a short period of time; nor is there a strong theoretical reason to 
aggregate terrorism on an annual basis. These are conventions, and they are not to be 
rejected lightly. I am not rejecting those approaches, but offering a new approach. If we 
hypothesize, for example, that as a country moves from Not Free to Free, the country will 
encounter more (or less) terrorism, we must consider the timeframe within which both the 
formal, procedural changes would take place, as well as the more substantive, cultural 
non-democratic to democratic changes. If Country X moves from a Freedom Rating 3 to 
Freedom Rating1 from 1980 to 1981, it would not be expected that government policies 
and procedures would change overnight, that government accountability and 
responsiveness to the citizenry would change so quickly, nor that political groups, 
particularly those outside of power, would automatically adopt a compromise-
negotiation-solve problems without the use of force set of attitudes. Both institutional 
change and political cultural adaptation take time, and by all accounts, that amount of 
time is more than one year. The behavioral variation the model the model is attempting to 
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capture would not match the numerical variation in the operationalized variable. This 
mismatch is problematic. I suggest a ten-year time frame to allow for meaningful 
institutional and political cultural change. Obviously, this is subject to debate, but it is a 
step in the right direction away from thinking in terms of annual variation. 
Table 2 
DECADE FR1 FR2 FR3 
1975-1984 51% 33% 16% N=21,329  (20.4% of total) 
1985-1995 35% 49% 16% N=37,205  (35.5% of total) 
1996-2005 27% 44% 29% N=18,081  (17.2% of total) 
Figure 5 
Table 2 and Figure 5 show a decided shift in the distribution of terrorism over 
time. Countries in the Free category encountered terrorist events close to one-half the rate 
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1970s to mid-1980s.13 On the other hand, rates for Partly Free and Not Free countries 
increased, approximately 33% and nearly 100% respectively. These two “book-end” 
decades are important, because they represent the growing rates of terrorism in both the 
first and second “peak periods” (see Figure 1). Given this longitudinal data, one could 
argue that democracies were more likely to encounter terrorism during the middle of the 
Cold War period and less likely to encounter terrorism in the post-Cold War period (not 
that the Cold war is the causal variable—it is simply a convenient historical marker).14 
This conclusion would accept the null, and reject the hypothesis that political system 
structure has a significant, long-term affect on terrorism. 
The results of this back-to-basics approach to test the hypothesis that political 
system type influences the level of terrorism lead me to conclude that the democratic or 
non-democratic nature of a country’s political system does not significantly, consistently, 
impact unconventional political behavior. Levels of terrorism have fluctuated 
significantly over time, with far more volatility than concomitant changes in political 
structures. Democracies faced more terrorism decades ago, but non-democracies face 
more now. Regimes straddling the democracy/non-democracy fence encounter the most 
terrorism intensity. 
Where do we go from here? We need to keep reflecting on the operationalization 
of the most important concepts under study, think critically about theoretical relationships 
between variables, and apply appropriate datasets with care. Given the fact that twenty-
seven countries (and geographic regions like the West Bank and Northern Ireland) 
account for 85% of the incidents of terrorism from 1970-2011,15 and given that those 
incidents are restricted, in general, to limited periods of time, a more contextual approach 
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might be the most appropriate to understanding terrorism. This is not to say we must 
avoid quantitative analysis, or only focus on one case at a time. We should find a middle 
ground—use aggregate data to help us identify key areas of the world, across time, where 
most unconventional political violence is taking place, and then build more contextually 
driven comparative multivariate models (most similar systems or most different systems, 
or some mix). A multi-case comparative approach might provide the middle ground we 
are looking for, where available data and appropriate methodology meet. However we 
move forward, the weaknesses of past analyses, along with the empirically demonstrated 
volatility in terrorist intensity over time and space, should give us, and our desires to 
make global generalizations about terrorism, pause. 
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ENDNOTES	  
1	  The author would like to thank JPPP Executive Editor Arlene Dallalfar and the 
anonymous JPPP reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. A previous 
version of this paper, under the title “A Quantitative Analysis of the Historical and 
Systemic Determinants of Terrorism,” was presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
Midwest Political Science Association in April 2014. 
2	  There is no common or universally accepted definition of terrorism; the typical 
elements of a definition used in most literature on the subject are: the use or threat of the 
use of (extra-normal) violence (by sub-state actors) for political objectives, where force is 
used against a target not only to affect the target but to intimidate a larger audience. 
Definitions change slightly among scholars of this type of violence, but in the 
quantitative literature, there is more uniformity because the definitions are driven by the 
concepts used in gathering the data. In a sense, the raw data gatherers drive the 
definitions used in the theoretical work. 
There are deeper issues with the definition. Because it has become so politicized (e.g. 
freedom fighter v. terrorist), and because the term is used so often and applied to just 
about any kind of violence we don’t like, it is clear that we, as scholars, as well as 
politicians and pundits, do not have a clear understanding of how terrorism is different 
from other forms of political violence (war, insurgency, resistance, anarchy, etc.). This is 
both a theoretical problem (how do we study what we can’t identify universally?) and 
methodologically, because it shapes the kinds of data that is collected. 
3	  The latest literature on the topic of terrorism includes analyses and reports on state and 
local responses, and preparedness to respond to, crises/emergencies like those faced in 
Boston, MA in 2013. These types of analyses fall outside the focus of this paper, but 
provide insight in to the technocratic, bureaucratic, and local-capacity issues related to 
the more often discussed theoretical, political and ideological perspectives on terrorism 
and extremist violence. For a recent example, see Leonard et al. 2014. 
4 Young and Findley’s main points can be summarized as these: we still have definitional 
problems with the term ‘terrorism;’ we do not treat domestic and international terrorism 
separately, as might be theoretically justified; and the unit of analysis under study is 
questionable and needs more explanation/justification (e.g., use events by year by country, 
or events by strategic dyads of interactions, etc.). 
5	  Acts of transnational terrorism are acts that include actors or sites from more than one 
nation-state. For example, a group could attack a site in another country (different from 
its home country). A group could attack within its home country, but attack citizens from 
other countries. An attack could take place in international waters, or on international 
flights, etc. Some facet of multi-nationalism must be present for an act to be considered 
transnational. Suicide attacks are self-explanatory. “Exporting” terrorism is a reference to 
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actions or policies that would promote terrorism in a transnational context, “creating” 
terrorism/terrorists and “sending” them out to act around the world, for example. 
6 More recent analyses by Piazza (2007, 2008(a), 2008(b)) test variations on the 
democracy/terrorism theme, but are limited by region (Middle East, 2007) and by type of 
terrorism (suicide attacks, 2008(a)) and the specific impact of an economic system 
(2008(b)).
7 If the logic of this argument holds, it would add more evidence to the theoretical 
position that non-democratic political environments are more likely to generate acts of 
terrorism than are democratic political environments. 
8	  Perhaps even more interesting is the tie between these types of control/explanatory 
variables in the terrorism literature with similar types of explanatory variables used in the 
social movement literature. Representative examples from the sociology literature might 
include: relative deprivation (Davies 1962), resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 
1977) and political opportunity (McAdam 1982). There are two things to note: first, 
political scientists rarely cite examples of where variables or explanations have been used 
in other disciplines (none of the terrorism articles I reviewed had any reference to non-
political science sources for variable inclusion in models); second, by using variables so 
closely associated with other political behavior, political scientists are essentially 
claiming that terrorism is just another form or extension of, for example, social 
movements, rather than something fundamentally different. This points back to our 
problems with definitions, and the fuzziness of our theoretical understanding of the 
supplemental variables needed to push an actor to engage in terrorism (as opposed to, for 
example, civil disobedience). 
9 It could be argued, for example, that the experience of the United States is one of an 
outlier. No other act of terrorism in the 20th century history of terrorism (as defined 
herein) comes close to have claimed the lives of thousands and the property damage of 
tens of billions. The United States is also an outlier on the variable measuring degree of 
freedom (democracy) because it has been and continues to be one of the top powers 
(historically phrased “Superpower”) in the international system, which creates for it a 
very different kind of political environment than the democratic environments found in 
most other democracies. The combination of its power status and the severity of the 
events of September 11, 2001, skew terrorism data significantly. The fact that the total 
number of people killed by acts of terrorism, for all countries minus the U.S. from 1973-
2011, might not even reach the number killed that one day in history, demonstrates just 
how much “pull” the U.S. case has on any global, quantitative analysis of terrorism. 
10 Due to the fact that for many events no property damage was recorded (i.e., blanks 
cells in the dataset or numbers representing “unknown”), a multiplier problem arose. If 
left unchanged, the (E+PK+PW) would end up being multiplied by zero, which would 
create a Terrorism Intensity Index of zero for that event. To avoid this problem, the 
multiplier used was (1+PD). If the event had no property damage, the multiple would be 
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1, saving the event, and not inflating it in any way. However, TII values are higher than 
they would be using (1, 2, 3 as the PD value) because the real multiples for any event 
with PD end up being (2, 3, 4). This absolute value has no inherent meaning, so it does 
not bias the scores in any way (they are all treated the same way)—the scores are still 
ordinal, and the raw TII is recoded as (1, 2, 3), so unusually high scores are normalized. 
11	  As for bias, whether a country is more likely to be coded as Free given its relative 
status vis-à-vis the United States, I see no theoretical connection to that and the violence 
itself. Let’s argue, for example, that it is difficult to be labeled a Free country; that would 
put more countries in the Not Free or Partly Free categories (if we reduce to the Freedom 
House rankings of 1-3). This situation could act as a particularly rigorous test of the 
democracy/terrorism hypothesis. If there are fewer Free countries, and most terrorism is 
driven by democracies, then the relationship should be clear and obvious. If the number 
of states per category is the primary driver of terrorism event counts, then the type of 
system, per se, might have less to do with the amount of terrorism in the system. Perhaps, 
on the other hand, if it were “easier” to list countries as Free, there would be more 
countries in the Free category, and if they were more democratic and we do see more 
terrorism in those “newly” coded countries, then there would be a bias against the 
primary causal relationship that really is present. Steiner argues this was a more 
significant coding problem prior to the end of the Cold War, and less so since. It is also 
interesting to note that one would expect countries that are allies of the United States to 
be more democratic, because the U.S. has tended to be allied (formally) with states 
similar to itself (including those it made in its own image after WWII). Whatever the case 
for pre-existing conditions, the nuance, and, again, given the rougher, first-cut approach I 
am taking, I find this coding challenge to be less relevant. Lastly, authors such as Li 
(cited above), have run analyses with a variety of measures of “democracy” and have not 
found significant differences between the data sets; the nuanced differences in the 
alternative measures of democracy are simply very highly correlated. 
12 A second noticeable trend is the change in “colors” across time. Even a cursory review 
shows that the dominant colors, or countries, changes from the first full bell-curve in the 
1970s and 1980s and the first part of the second bell-curve in the early 2000s: the largest 
number of events were taking place in South America during the early surge; the largest 
number of events in the second surge were taking place in Africa, Southwest Asia and 
Southeast Asia. Recognizing this might lead us to believe that political systems under 
stress might lead to more of all types of violence than systems not under stress, regardless 
of their official status as democratic or non-democratic. 
13 Some have argued that while the number of incidents might be declining, the intensity 
of the attacks is increasing. While this is true in general, it is not true for countries rated 
as Free. From 1975-1984 and from 1985-1995, 1% of all terrorist events were coded with 
an intensity rating of 3; in 1996-2005, that percentage rose to 2.4. However, the 
percentage of terrorist events coded as intensity level 3 for countries labeled Free in those 
same decades did not follow suit, or even change significantly: 1975-1984 22%, 1985-
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1995 20%, 1996-2005 20%). 
14 Also important to note: the last decade, as measured with this dataset and as set forth in 
this analysis, has the fewest number of incidents, or total amount of terrorism, of the three 
decades captured. 
15 I came to these numbers by looking at the total number of events across the dataset, by 
geographic area (state or territory) and selected those areas that had encountered at least 
1000 terrorist events over the forty-year period. Given that these two dozen territories 
account for between 8 and 9 events out of every ten in the dataset, one might argue that 
the countries facing terrorism, are, in general, outliers. Most countries rarely, if ever, 
have to deal with the problem directly. 
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